Long run performance of IPOs and the role of financial analysts: some French evidence by Boissin, Romain & Sentis, Patrick
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Long run performance of IPOs and the
role of financial analysts: some French
evidence
Romain Boissin and Patrick Sentis
University of Montpellier, Center for Research on Management and
markets
November 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39800/
MPRA Paper No. 39800, posted 3 July 2012 15:20 UTC
 1 
Long run performance of IPOs and the role of financial analysts: some French evidence. 
Romain Boissin: CR2M – University of Montpellier 1, France Metropolitan 
Patrick Sentis: CR2M – GSCM Montpellier Business School, Montpellier Cedex 1, France 
Metropolitan 
 
CONTACT: Romain Boissin, CR2M, Faculté d’Administration et Gestion de Montpellier, 
Avenue de la Mer, 34054 Montpellier Cedex 1, France, Metropolitan. 
(T) +33 6 23 75 72 15, Email : rboissin@hotmail.com 
 
November, 2010 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the long run performance of French IPOs carried out between 1991 and 
2005. By using various methodologies, we find that IPOs in our sample performed negatively 
relative to comparison portfolios over the 1991-2005 horizon, unlike prior studies applied to 
French market. This abnormal long run performance is much severe for orphans’ IPOs 
(without financial recommendation) than non orphans’ IPOs from one to three-year horizon 
(statistically significant). The evidence suggests that analyst coverage is indeed important to 
issuing firm but the market do not fully incorporate the perceived value of this coverage. 
Further analysis reveals that this outperformance by non orphan stems from high coverage. 
Investors pay more attention for non orphan when IPOs are venture capital backed, with a big 
underwriting syndicate and low underpriced. Over the 1991-2005 period, analyst’s affiliation 
does not appear to matter. This result is inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis. 
We establish that analyst recommendations are significantly related to long run performance 
of IPOs. Then we corroborate the crucial role of financial analysts in producing and 
interpreting IPOs’ financial releases. 
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Introduction 
 
 The last decade of crisis has been turbulent for analysts’ research. During the 
internet bubble period (1999 to 2000), the media and investors have pressured analysts to 
focus on the ‘hot’ industries. In every bull market there are excesses that become apparent by 
contrast with a following bear market. Therefore, in 2001 (the burst of the internet bubble), 
investors needed to blame somebody and analysts were fall guys. Both regulators and the 
financial press have pointed out that analysts’ research was tainted by conflicts of interest, and 
academic literature has revealed that analysts were biased towards providing favorable reports 
to the detriment of their objectivity and reputation. From 1998 to 2001, an “all star” analyst 
issued 16 buy recommendations on Global crossing. The stock was 61$ in 1999 and had 
collapsed to around 1$ in 2001, the analyst finally revised his rating from buy to hold. Of the 
10 firms he covered, 5 trade below 1$ a share, 3 have filed for bankruptcy. 
On this report, Attorney General Eliot Spitzer pointed out performance of recommendations 
during institutional investor award dinner in 2002. “These are the institutional investor 
awards, and thus reflect criteria important to institutional investors, who prize analysts' 
accessibility, their insights and their ability to uncover a valuable piece of information about a 
company or sector, and their access to management. 
What these awards do not measure is the performance of analysts' buy, sell and hold 
recommendation.” “…The investing public is not aware that the awards don't reflect the 
performance of your stock recommendations.” 
In this study, we investigate the long run performance and the irrational investors’ behaviour 
hypothesis by examining whether financial analyst recommendations allow alleviating this 
irrationality. Miller (1977) pointed out that, as the information is revealed to the market, 
investors downgrade their expectations and support the long run underperformance 
phenomenon. We expect that by reducing the information asymmetry, financial analyst 
recommendations help investors to define progressively the true value of the firm. We focus 
on the long run performance of French IPOs made between 1991 and 2005. To the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first study which investigates the link between the financial analyst 
recommendations and the performance of French IPOs over this recent period. 
Some French studies find no abnormal long run performance (see Degeorge and Derrien, 
2001). Our observation period is large and overlaps the so-called bubble period characterized 
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by a strong information asymmetry. We analyse long run performance from one year to five 
year following the IPO. 
We measure the influence of financial analysts’ recommendation on the long run performance 
of IPOs during a five-year horizon. Then, we are able to observe the adjustment of long run 
performance to recommendation disclosures. 
Conversely to previous studies, we find significant long run underperformance of French 
IPOs from two to five-year horizon. This finding can be partly attributed to the inclusion of 
recent IPOs which underperform strongly. Significant differences appear between the long 
run performance of orphan (IPOs without analyst coverage) and non orphan (IPOs with 
analyst coverage). For instance, buy-and-hold abnormal returns for orphan are a significant -
11,41% compared to an insignificant 4,29% for non orphan the first year following the IPO, a 
difference that is statistically significant. Further analysis reveals that this outperformance by 
non orphan stems from high coverage. 
Finally, our results are robust after conditioning for venture capital backing, underwriting 
syndicate, underpricing, analyst affiliation, or operating performance variables. 
The paper is organized as follows: we first analyze the existing literature in order to define 
our hypothesis. In a second section, we describe methodology, data and sample statistics. The 
third section presents findings. The last section concludes. 
 
1 – Prior literature and hypothesis development: 
 
1.1 – Is the analyst’s coverage crucial to IPOs? 
 
Analyst recommendations are valuable for several reasons. Analyst coverage can generate 
publicity for the IPO and increases firm value by generating more customers (Cliff and Denis, 
2004). As Chen and Ritter (2000) and Aggarwal and al.(2002) argue, recommendations can 
boost share price that is very important for insiders wishing to sell their shares at the end of 
the lock-up period. Academic research points out the importance of analysts’ coverage over 
the years. Krigman and al. (2001) suggest that the most important motivation for firms to 
switch underwriters between an IPO and seasoned equity offering is to obtain additional and 
influential analyst coverage. Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Cliff and Denis (2004) argue 
that underpricing of newly public firms is positively related to analyst coverage. According to 
Loughran and Ritter (2004), the average underpricing on IPOs was 7% in the 1980s and 
doubled to 15% during 1990-1998, before jumping to 65% during the internet bubble. Part of 
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this increase can be attributed to the analysts’ coverage which has become very important 
over the years. Bradley and al. (2003) show that the number of managing underwriters in a 
syndicate is a very good indicator to predict which firms are likely to have coverage, but also 
which ones will have multiple coverage. Corwin and Schultz (2005) examine syndicates for 
1638 IPOs and find evidence that each additional co managers results in 0,8 additional analyst 
issuing recommendations in the three months after the IPO. 
While research coverage appears important for IPO firms, an examination of IPO firms’ 
performance with and without analyst coverage may explain what value to attribute to the 
analyst coverage. Conflicts of interest have called into question whether analyst coverage is 
valuable. If affiliated analyst issues biased recommendations (according to previous 
literature), we cannot presume that the long run performance of orphan’s IPOs (firms without 
analyst coverage) will be inferior to non orphan’s IPOs (firms with analyst coverage) without 
controlling for the affiliation.  
H1: Long run performance of non orphan’s IPOs may be superior to orphan’s IPOs. 
 
1.2 - The role of financial analysts: 
 
1.2.1 - Recommendations have investment value. 
Analysts both provide new information and interpret previously released information. Most 
prior studies have concluded that the information they produce promotes market efficiency by 
helping investors to more accurately value companies. One possible source of this value is the 
ability of analysts to collect information useful in identifying undervalued or overvalued 
stock. An analyst’s report includes the collection and evaluation of information related to a 
firm’s future performance. The analyst obtains information from various sources including: 
conference calls and other management communications, general assembly and financial 
meeting, reports describing macro-economic conditions. From this information the analyst 
produces earnings forecasts, target price and stock recommendations. Investors use these 
outputs to make trading decisions. Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) examine analyst 
recommendations in the G7 countries and evaluate the value of these recommendations over 
the 1993 to 2002 period. The authors find that the frequencies of sell and strong sell 
recommendations (15.3%) in all countries are far less than that of buy and strong buy 
recommendations (46.9%). Asquith and al.(2005) document, using a sample of 1126 analyst 
reports, that analysts rarely issue sell or strong sell recommendations. The authors show that 
only 0.5% of the recommendations fall into these two categories. In contrast, 30.8% of the 
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recommendations are classified as strong buy, 40% as buy, and 28.7% as hold. A reason for 
the lack of negative recommendations is that an analyst’s salary and bonus are linked to his 
firm’s underwriting fees or commissions generated by his recommendations. Furthermore, 
analysts rely on company management for information and thus have a reason to maintain 
good relation with them. Barber and al. (2001) examine whether investors can profit from the 
analyst recommendations and these recommendations remain valuable. 
Numerous studies distinguish four types of recommendations: initiation, reiteration, upgrade 
and downgrade. Initiation is defined as the first report an analyst produces about the firm. 
Bradley and al. (2008) show that initiations of coverage occur immediately after the end of 
the quiet period. Reiteration is defined as a restatement of a previously issued 
recommendation. Upgrades and downgrades are issued when analysts change their position 
on a stock that they are covering. The authors find that initiations on average elicit positive 
responses and that there is a large positive (negative) market reaction associated with 
upgrades (downgrades). According to Bagchee (2003), the strong response to both positive 
and negative revisions is not very surprising in the case of IPO considering their newness and 
the lack of public information about them. This study shows that downgrades are more likely 
to occur than upgrades. Irvine (2003) compares the return surrounding an analyst’s initiation 
of coverage to the return surrounding a recommendation by an analyst who already covers the 
stock (so-called continuation). Using a sample of 2128 analyst’s recommendations over the 
period 1995, he finds that the market responds more positively to analyst’s initiations than to 
other recommendations. The market interprets analyst initiation as a positive signal. 
According to Bradley and al. (2003), analysts almost always initiate coverage with a buy or 
strong buy recommendation. This is consistent with Sayrak and Dhiensiri (2004) who find 
positive abnormal returns at the time of the initiations. 
It appears that analyst recommendations add value for investors. Stock recommendations are 
costly for the analysts to provide. These costs include costs of investigation but also any 
reputation costs associated with incorrect recommendations. Finally, according to Houston 
and al. (2006) and Brav and Lehavy (2003) the market believes that there is some information 
in analyst recommendations and that the market places some credence in their 
recommendations. If recommendations have investment value, so we hypothesize: 
H2: Market reaction may be associated to the nature of recommendations. 
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1.2.2 - The characteristics of financial analysts: 
Analysts have not the same access to information. Affiliated analysts (analyst whose 
employer is a managing underwriter at the IPO) have superior access to information. As 
Jegadeesh and al. (2004) note analysts recommend firms with past strong performances and 
firms waited to have good expectations. 
It is widely noted that analysts face conflicts of interest1. Prior studies have documented two 
alternatives hypothesis (Michaely and Womack, 1999, Lin and Mc Nichols, 1998).Under the 
conflict of interest hypothesis analysts may have to give positive recommendations to 
compete for future investment banking business, to generate trading commissions (Hayes, 
1998, Irvine, 2004) or to maintain management relations and their access to the information 
(Francis and Philbrick, 1993, Das and al., 1998)2. Under the non-strategic hypothesis, issuers 
choose underwriters who are optimistic about their prospects. Michaely and Womack (1999) 
find, using a sample of 391 IPO in the USA over the period 1990 and 1991, that affiliated 
analyst recommendations perform more poorly than recommendations by unaffiliated analysts 
(consistent with Iskoz, 2003, Houston and al., 2006). Affiliated analysts issue 
recommendations that are overly optimistic (positively biased) and these analysts may be 
compelled to issue more positive recommendations on firms that have traded poorly in IPO 
aftermarket (consistent with James and Karceski, 2006). According to Chen (2004), even 
though the market reaction to favorable recommendations is less positive for affiliated 
analysts, long run return analyses suggest that analysts’ affiliation is not significantly 
associated with long run abnormal returns after recommendations. 
Michaely and Womack (1999) suggest some explanations to understand affiliation bias. The 
first one is that affiliated analyst believes that the firms he covers are better than the firms 
covered by other financial analysts. He would be not objective and able to accept that the firm 
he recommends does not show exceptional profits. This first explanation reveals an anchor 
bias (or overoptimism bias). 
The second one is that analyst is partly chosen because of the favorable views he has about 
the firm. This reveals a selection bias, strategic choice assuring the firm to have favorable 
recommendations. Dechow and al. (2000) examine long-term earnings growth forecasts for 
seasoned equity offerings and establish a direct link between overoptimism of growth 
forecasts and the post-offering underperformance. Rajan and Servaes (1997) find that in the 
long run, IPOs have better stock performance when analysts ascribe low growth potential 
rather than high growth potential. However, the authors do not explain underperformance as 
the consequence of an overoptimism of growth forecasts. 
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As in Bradley and al. (2008), we focus on the market’s reaction to a recommendation made by 
an affiliated analyst or not. Affiliated recommendations may be associated with a more 
positive announcement effect than unaffiliated recommendations if the market views these 
analysts as having sufficiently superior information or expertise to more than offset any 
conflicts of interest. 
H3a: Market reaction to affiliated recommendation may be associated with a more positive 
announcement effect than unaffiliated recommendations. 
Affiliated recommendations may be associated with a less positive announcement effect than 
unaffiliated recommendations if the market views these analysts as having a greater conflict 
of interest that is not offset by superior information. 
H3b: Market reaction to affiliated recommendation may be associated with a less positive 
announcement effect than unaffiliated recommendations. 
 Lastly, there may be no difference in announcement effects because the market is naïve about 
the differential conflicts of interest. 
H3c: Market reaction may be no difference in announcement effects between affiliated and 
unaffiliated recommendations. 
 
1.3 - Long run performance of IPOs: some international evidence: 
 
Many studies have documented an abnormal long run underperformance three to five years 
after IPOs’ issues. For instance, Ritter (1991) compares over a three-year horizon, the 
performance of 1526 U.S. IPOs between 1975 and 1984 to firms already listed with the same 
characteristics (market capitalisation and industry). It appears that long run performance after 
the offering is 34.47% relative to 61.86% for a group of matching firms. Ritter emphasizes 
that underperformance is concentrated on younger companies and during hot market period. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) study the performance over a five-year horizon using a sample of 
4750 U.S. IPOs in the 1970-1990 period. On average, the annual return over 5 years is 5%. 
The authors find that investing an equal amount at the same time in a nonissuing firm with 
approximately the same market capitalisation returns an average compound of 12%. 
This underperformance is mainly explained by irrational investors’ behaviour when they 
invest in a context of strong uncertainty. Theo, Welch and Wong (1998) find that earnings 
manipulation by managers at the time of the IPO may be an argument of investors’ 
overoptimism. Likewise, this anomaly can find an explanation in the role of underwriters who 
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underprice IPOs. The strong fluctuations of shares on the first days put the firm under the 
spotlight and attract investors. This makes a short movement of enthusiasm once fad dropped. 
The underperformance of IPOs is not a singular phenomenon of U.S. market. Levis (1993) 
focus on IPOs made in the U.K. market over the 1980-1988 period. The author finds an 
underperformance between -8% and -23% relative to benchmarks used. Kooli and Suret 
(2004) study the long run performance of newly public firms on Canadian market. Their study 
reveals a five years long run underperformance of –24.66% for a sample of 445 IPOs between 
1991 and 1998. Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993), report an underperformance of -47%, 
-19.6%, and –23.7% for IPOs in Brazil, Mexico and Chile respectively. 
The findings of long run underperformance are controversial. Brav and Gompers (1997) argue 
that underperformance of IPOs disappear once book-to-market and size effects are taken into 
account. Over a sample of 3661 U.S. IPOs between 1935 and 1972, Gompers and Lerner 
(2003) find underperformance when they use methodology of buy-and-hold abnormal return, 
the authors note underperformance disappear when they use methodology of cumulative 
abnormal return. In other words, the long run performance of IPOs depends on the method 
employed. 
 
2 - Methodologies, data and sample statistics: 
 
2.1 - Methodologies: 
 
 The results of long term performance studies are very sensitive to methodological choices. 
We present our results using two frequently used and recommended methodologies (Brav and 
Gompers (1997), Barber and Lyon (1997)). 
Firstly, we use the calendar-time approach as in Fama and French (1996). Their three-factor 
model says that the expected return on a portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate [(ERi) – Rf ] is 
explained by the sensitivity of its return to three factors: (i) the excess return on a broad 
market portfolio (RM – Rf); (ii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks 
and the return on a portfolio of big stocks (SMB, small minus big); and (iii) the difference 
between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio 
of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low). Specifically, the expected excess 
return on portfolio i is, 
 
 −  = 	 + ER − R + ESMB + ℎEHML + , 
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where  E(Ri) is the monthly return on the IPO portfolio, Rf is the one-month Treasury bill rate, 
E (RM) is the monthly return on a value-weight market portfolio of Euronext stocks, E(SMB) 
is the difference between the returns on portfolios of small and big stocks (below or above the 
Euronext median), and E(HML) is the difference between the returns on portfolios of high- 
and low-book to market stocks (above and below the 0.7 and 0.3 fractiles of book-to-market 
ratios). 
Secondly, we perform an event-time approach as in Brav and Gompers (1997). Fama and 
French (1992, 1993) have shown that size and book-to-market are important determinants of 
the cross section of stock returns. We compare performance of IPOs to size and book-to-
market portfolios. Starting in January 1991, we use all Euronext stocks to create size quartile 
breakpoints with an equal number of firms in each size quartile. Size is measured as the 
number of shares outstanding times the stock price at the end of the preceding month. 
Monthly book-to-market data are extracted from Amadeus database for eazch firm. Within 
each size quartile we form four book-to-market portfolios with an equal number of firms in 
each boo-to-market quartile to form 16 size and book-to-market portfolios. Value weighted 
returns are calculated for each portfolios. In order to avoid comparing IPO firms to 
themselves, we eliminate IPO firms from the various portfolios for five years after their equity 
issue. Each issue is matched to its corresponding benchmark portfolio. 
Long term performance is calculated using Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR). 
The return on a buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm less the return on a buy-and-hold 
investment in a portfolio with an appropriate expected return (BHAR) is 
 = 1 +  −  1 + 
!
"#
!
"#
 
where Rit is defined as the month t simple return on a sample firm, E(Rit) as the month t 
expected return for the sample firm, i.e. the return of firm i’s benchmark over the same 
period. 
 
2.2 - Data and sample statistics: 
 
Three types of variables are used in this study. 
• Ex-ante IPO-specific variables (venture capital, shares offered, underwriters...) were found 
in SDC Platinum database. Our sample contains 270 IPOs that were conducted in France over 
the 1991-2005 period. We include all IPOs, with the exception of transfers from one market to 
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another and IPO which conducts a SEO within 5 years of the IPO date is also excluded. None 
of IPO delisted occurs within five years of issuance. 
• Ex-post IPO variables, we focus on recommendations made by financial analysts. These 
recommendations come from the analyst-by-analyst I/B/E/S historical earnings estimate 
database. I/B/E/S provides us 6,733 recommendations made during the five years following 
IPO between 1991 and 2005. 
• Long run performance variables. The long run performance is calculated using the 
Datastream monthly stock price database. 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of orphan versus non orphan IPOs. There are 98 IPOs 
classified as orphan and 172 IPOs classified as non orphan. The average orphan raises €174.1 
million in its IPO compared to €215 million for the average non orphan. This difference is 
statistically significant at 5% level using non parametric test. Consistent with prior research, 
analyst coverage is increasing in firm size. Characteristics of age are not statistically 
significant between non orphan and orphan and long term debt for non orphan is higher than 
orphan IPOs (significant at 10% level using w test). We find no difference in venture capital 
backing for orphans and non orphans. Orphans are associated with less underwriting syndicate 
with a mean of 1.96 managing underwriters compared to 3.14 for non orphan. According to 
previous studies, a large underwriting syndicate attracts analyst coverage (statistically 
significant at 1% level). There is no relationship between analyst coverage and underpricing. 
For instance, orphans have initial returns of 5.75% compared to 11.14% for non orphans. Non 
orphans are more underpriced than orphans but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Finally, Panel B shows that orphans or non orphans are not concentrate in particular industry 
or period. Orphans are less likely to have a high tech orientation compared to non orphans. 
20% of non orphan IPOs are high-tech compared to 10% of orphan IPOs (not statistically 
significant). The number of non orphan IPOs has decreased over the 2001-2005 period. This 
reflects that French IPOs suffer of a lack of analysts’ coverage. Among the 18 IPOs carried 
out in 2003, none of them has been covered by financial analysts. Only 2 were covered among 
the 35 firms that went public in 2004. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
This table provides characteristics of orphans versus non orphans. An orphan (non orphan) means IPO without 
analyst coverage (with analyst coverage). IPO is number of issuing firm. AGE is the age of the issuing firm at 
the time of the offer in year. LONG TERM DEBT represents all interest bearing financial obligations, excluding 
amounts due within one year at the offering date in million. SIZE is the market capitalization at the offering date 
in million. VC AFFILIATION is the percentage of firms that are affiliated to venture capitalists. 
UNDERWRITING SYNDICATE is the number of managing underwriters (lead plus co-managers). 
UNDERPRICING is the percentage difference between the close on the first day of trading and the offer price. 
Medians are in parentheses. Student parametric (t) test and Wilcoxon (w) non parametric test are presented to 
estimate whether the difference between sample distribution is statistically significant. *; ** and *** indicates 
significant difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Panel A: Orphan versus Non orphan over the 1991-2005 period. 
 Orphan Non orphan t w 
IPO 98 172   
AGE 19 (10) 21 (13) 0,7 1,4 
LONG TERM DEBT 41,2 (3,5) 47,5 (6) 0,3 1,6* 
SIZE 174,1 (42,1) 215 (54,3) 0,6 1,9** 
VC AFFILIATION 18,28% 12,79% -1,2 -1,2 
UNDERWRITING SYNDICATE 1,96 3,14 3*** 3,6*** 
UNDERPRICING 5,75% 11,14% 1,1 0,9 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (suite) 
Panel B provides characteristics of orphans versus non orphans. An orphan (non orphan) means IPO without analyst coverage (with analyst coverage). IPO is number of 
issuing firm. INDUSTRY GROUP is defined at the first two digits code provided by Worldscope.  
Panel B: Sample distributed by sub-periods. 
 Orphan Non orphan 
 1991 to 1998 1999 to 2000 2001 to 2005 1991 to 2005 1991 to 1998 1999 to 2000 2001 to 2005 1991 to 2005 
IPO 38 28 32 98 92 63 17 172 
INDUSTRY GROUP         
Apparel 1   1 1  1 2 
Automotive 3   3 2 1  3 
Chemicals  2  2 3   3 
Construction 1 2 1 4  1 3 4 
Diversified  1  1 4 2  6 
Drugs, Cosmetics & Health Care 1  3 4 3   3 
Electrical 1  2 3 3 3  6 
Electronics 2 5 3 10 17 17 2 36 
Financial 2  4 6 5 4 2 11 
Machinery & Equipment 1 1 2 4 6   6 
Metal Product Manufacturers 1   1 2  1 3 
Miscellaneous 4 9 5 18 4 3 3 10 
Paper 1   1 1   1 
Recreation 1 2 2 5 5 1  6 
Retailers 2 1  3 7 5  12 
Textiles 3   3 1   1 
Transportation     2   2 
Utilities  1 5 6 1 3 1 5 
Food & Beverages 1   1 8 2  10 
Advertising agencies 1   1 2 1 1 4 
Hotel & motel chains   1 1  1  1 
Medical Services 1   1 2 1 2 5 
Scientific equipment & supplies 1   1  1  1 
Service Organizations 5 2 4 11 8 15 1 24 
Wholesale 5 2  7 5 2  7 
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3 - Results: 
 
3.1 - Long run performance of IPOs: 
 
We report in this part the findings related to the performance of newly public firms 
over the five-year horizon. Two methodologies have been chosen in this study: the 
size and book-to-market adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return as in Brav and 
Gompers (1997) and the Fama-French three-factor model. 
 
3.1.1 - The event-time approach: 
Table 2 shows that French IPOs have statistically significant long run 
underperformance from three to five-year horizon. IPOs have mean performance 
from -28,85% over the three years following their offerings to -68,10% over the five-
year horizon (both t and w tests are statistically significant at 1% level). It is worth 
noting that 12-month performances of French IPOs over the entire period present a 
positive abnormal return.  
Over the 1991-1998 period, like Degeorge and Derrien (2001) and Sentis (2001), we 
find that French IPOs have on average no abnormal performance over the three-year 
horizon. Once we extend the horizon to 4 years after the issuance, IPOs exhibit an 
underperformance statistically significant at 1% level by both t and w tests. This 
result is confirmed over the 60-month performances.  
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Table 2 : Long run performance of IPOs 
Table 2 presents long run Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns over 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60-month performances. Sample consists of 270 French IPOs made between 1991 and 
2005. Bootstrapped Skewness-Adjusted (t) test and Wilcoxon (w) non parametric test are presented to estimate whether BHAR is statistically significant. *, **and *** 
indicates significant difference at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Medians are in parentheses. 
 1991 to 1998 1999 to 2000 2001 to 2005 1991 to 2005 
  
Mean 
 
 
t 
 
w 
 
Mean 
 
t w 
 
Mean 
 
t w 
 
Mean 
 
t w 
 
BHAR 60 -61,76% -4*** -6,7*** -80,26% -2,7*** -6,6*** -56,34% -2,7*** -2,5*** -68,10% -5,4*** -9,8*** 
 (-75,11%)   (-100,06%)   (-27,04%)   (-85,62%)   
             
BHAR 48 -51,18% -3,9*** -5,4*** -59,17% -3,2*** -6,5*** -41,44% -2** -2,7*** -52,78% -5,8*** -8,8*** 
 (-71,26%)   (-77,98%)   (-34,42%)   (-71,53%)   
             
BHAR 36 -18,52% -1,3 -3,9*** -40,34% -2,8*** -5,1*** -35,31% -3,8*** -3,3*** -28,85% -3,1*** -7,2*** 
 (-50,30%)   (-58,39%)   (-26,49%)   (-53,57%)   
             
BHAR 24 8,92% 0,7 -1,8* -29,02% -1,9** -4,2*** -17,26% -2,2** -2,1** -8,62% -1 -4,9*** 
 (-30,27%)   (-59,13%)   (-18,01%)   (-35,44%)   
             
BHAR 12 16,36% 2,9*** 1,1 15,48% 1 -1,3 -11,45% -2,2** -1,9** 11,02% 1,9** -1 
 (-3,93%)   (-22,41%)   (-5,47%)   (-9,23%)   
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3.1.2 - The calendar-time approach: 
We calculate long run performance using Fama-French three-factor model. The 
regression yields parameter estimates of αi, βi, si, and hi. The parameter of interest in 
this regression is the intercept, αi. A negative intercept indicates that after controlling 
for market, size, and book-to-market factors in returns, a sample firm has performed 
worse than expected. We use a calendar-time approach based on IPOs waves. Results 
are presented in table 3 and are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
 
Table 3: Fama-French  three-factor model 
Table 3 presents calendar-time approach based on IPOs waves. 1991 to 1998 and 2001 to 2003 are 
cold market periods whereas 1999 to 2000 and 2004 to 2007 are hot market periods. Coefficient 
estimates are reported in the table (with t-statistics in parentheses). 
 
E(Ri) – Rf = αi + βi[E(Rm) – Rf] + siE(SMB) + hiE(HML) + εi 
 
 1991 to 1998 1999 to 2000 2001 to 2003 2004 to 2007 
 130 IPOs 218 IPOs 241 IPOs 270 IPOs 
     
αi -0,001 -0,015 -0,007 -0,003 
 (-0,1) (-3,1)*** (-1,7)* (-2,3)** 
βi 1,245 1,836 1,480 1,298 
 (13,4)*** (7,2)*** (6,9)*** (27)*** 
si -0,073 0,672 -0,072 -0,047 
 (-0,4) (3,2)*** (-0,4) (-0,6) 
hi -0,081 -0,895 -0,265 -0,059 
 (-0,7) (-5,4)*** (-1,3) (-0,7) 
R² 0,70 0,91 0,89 0,96 
 
Table 3 shows intercept (αi) is negative over the four waves. Number of IPOs is 
cumulated across the sub-periods. IPOs tend to perform worse than expected. The 
intercept is statistically significant during hot market periods, that is 
underperformance is concentrated on this period (significant at 1% during internet 
bubble). Over the 2001-2003 and 2004-2007 periods, αi is statistically significant at 
conventional levels, this indicates that older IPOs (IPOs went public in the 1990s) 
explain long run abnormal return in the 2000s. 
 
3.2 – Long run performance of orphan versus non orphan IPOs. 
 
We now distinguish IPOs according to financial analysts coverage. Findings appear in 
table 4. Panel A shows that orphan and non orphan have statistically significant long 
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run underperformance from two to five-year horizon (confirmed by both t and w tests 
at 1% level). We find statistical difference between long run underperformance of 
orphan and non orphan within the two years after the offering. Underperformance is -
16.53% for non orphan compared to -30.17% for orphan over the two-year horizon, 
difference of 13.64% is significant at 10% level using t test. The 12-month 
performance shows analyst’s ability to predict long run performance before the 
disclosure of the financial statements. At the time of the IPO, investors are limited to 
material information contained in the prospectus. Informational asymmetries are 
particularly high. It is worth noting that the first year following the offering, there is 
not abnormal performance for non orphan (average of 4.29%, t=0.9). The first 12 
months following their offerings, orphans exhibit an underperformance of -11.41% 
whereas non orphans exhibit a performance of 4.29%. The difference of 15.7% is 
statistically significant by both t and w tests at 5% level. 
Our hypothesis H1 which posits that long run performance of non orphan IPOs may 
be superior to orphan IPOs is confirmed for the first year of floatation. 
However, after the first year of floatation, the difference between long run 
performance of orphan and non orphan IPOs are not any longer significant. This may 
be due to some endogeneity between the firm’s performance and analyst’s 
recommendations. Indeed, after the first year of floatation, firms have published their 
financial statements which can influence the analyst’s recommendation. Then, 
analyst’s recommendations are linked to past performance for a little part. 
These findings suggest that analyst coverage is indeed important to issuing firms 
during 1991 to 2005 but the market did not fully incorporate the perceived value of 
this coverage. Many other variables have been shown to influence long run 
performance of IPOs. Brav and Gompers (1997) find that IPOs with venture capital 
backing outperform non-venture capital backed IPOs. Venture capitalists provide 
potential future investment banking business to underwriters. So, analysts make 
favorable recommendations to keep venture capitalists happy. Jain and Kini (2000) 
find that venture-capital backed IPOs are characterised by greater analyst coverage. 
Rajan and Servaes (1997) and Aggarwal and al. (2002) argue that underpricing 
attracts analyst following. Bradley and al. (2003) and Corwin and Schultz (2005) find 
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that underwriting syndicate is related to research coverage. Therefore, if there is a 
relationship between analyst coverage and long run performance, then it could be a 
manifestation of these variables. We investigate these potential relationships by 
focusing on each of them separately. 
In panel B, the results of venture capital affiliation are presented. We partition our 
sample by ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ that means venture capital backed IPOs or non venture 
capital backed IPOs respectively. We find that there is no difference in long run 
performance between venture capital backed and non venture capital backed IPOs 
that receive analyst coverage. This result holds for the orphan IPOs excepted for the 
48-month performance. Globally, non orphan outperforms orphan once we control for 
the venture capital affiliation. Interestingly, there is a statistically significant 
difference in the 12-month performance between the venture capital backed orphan 
IPOs and the venture capital backed non orphan IPOs (-9.18% versus 7.31%). This 
could be attributable to the crucial role of financial analyst. 
In panel C, we find that non orphan IPOs with a big (small) underwriting syndicate 
(where IPOs with the number of managing underwriters above the median level are 
classified as ‘big’, otherwise ‘low’) outperform orphan IPOs with a big (small) one. 
The first year following the IPO, the performance of non orphan with a big 
underwriting syndicate is 6.53% compared to -19.67% for non orphan with a big 
underwriting syndicate. The difference of 26.2% is statistically significant and 
confirmed by both t and w tests at conventional levels. Hence, it appears that analyst 
coverage creates value for IPOs once controlling for the size of underwriting 
syndicate. 
As we discuss above, prior studies find a positive relationship between underpricing 
and analyst coverage. We would expect IPOs with high underpricing to be associated 
with analyst coverage. In Panel A, we document a positive relationship between 
analyst coverage and long run performance. Thus, the results in panel A indirectly 
imply a positive relationship between underpricing and long run performance, 
findings which would be inconsistent with the evidence in Rajan and Servaes (1997) 
or Carter and al (1998).Unlike these studies, panel D shows that high underpriced 
IPOs (where IPOs that have underpricing above the median level are classified as 
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‘high’, otherwise ‘low’) outperform low underpriced IPOs. Orphan with high 
underpricing has a 12-month performance of -5.97% compared to -19.66% for orphan 
with low underpricing. The difference of 13.69% is statistically significant at 10% 
level by w tests. This result remains statistically significant for 48 and 60-month 
performance by both t and w tests. The difference between high and low underpriced 
non orphan is not significant. Non orphan with low underpricing outperforms orphan 
with low underpricing over the one, three and four year horizon. Differences are 
statistically significant by both t and w tests at conventional levels. Finally, there is no 
difference in long run performance between orphan and non orphan with high 
underpricing. Hence, analyst’s coverage has investment value only for the low 
underpriced IPOs. 
To resume, these findings suggest that investors and market participants pay attention 
to analyst coverage when IPOs are venture capital backed, with a big underwriting 
syndicate and low underpriced. 
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Table 4: Long run performance of orphans vs non orphans over the 1991-2005 period. 
 
Table 4 presents long run performance of French IPOs classified as Orphan’s IPOs (without analyst coverage) and Non orphan’s IPOs (with analyst coverage).Panel A focuses on analyst 
coverage whereas panel B, C and D partition orphan and non orphan by other characteristics. Panel B distinguishes orphan and non orphan by venture capital affiliation. Yes and No mean 
venture capital backed IPOs and non venture capital backed IPOs respectively. Panel C distinguishes orphan and non orphan by underwriting syndicate. Number of managers above the 
median level is classified as Big, otherwise Small. Panel D partitions Orphan’s IPOs and Non orphan’s IPOs by underpricing where IPOs that have underpricing above the median level is 
classified as High otherwise Low. Long run performance is computed as Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns over 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60-month performances. Bootstrapped Skewness-
Adjusted (t) test and Wilcoxon (w) non parametric test are presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distribution are statistically significant. *; ** and *** 
indicates significant difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively. Returns are winsorized at the 5% and 95% level 
Panel A Orphan’s IPOs Non orphan’s IPOs 
t w 
           
 N Mean Median t w N Mean Median t w   
BHAR 60 63 -73,23% -84,16% -6,3*** -5,9*** 150 -79,33% -89,17% -10,1*** -9,6*** -0,6 -0,6 
BHAR 48 69 -67,26% -78,08% -6,3*** -6,4*** 155 -56,07% -70,26% -7,3*** -8*** 1,4 0,9 
BHAR 36 83 -47,16% -57,04% -4,4*** -5,9*** 153 -35,42% -51,06% -5,1*** -6,1*** 1,4 1,3 
BHAR 24 95 -30,17% -45,61% -3,8*** -5*** 146 -16,53% -29,45% -2,8*** -3,6*** 1,7* 1,3 
BHAR 12 113 -11,41% -16,53% -2,3** -3,2*** 126 4,29% -2% 0,9 0,4 2,3** 2,1** 
    
    
 Orphan’s IPOs Non orphan’s IPOs   
Panel B Venture Capital affiliation Yes No 
 Yes No t w Yes No t w t w t w 
BHAR 60 -68,43% -98,70% 1,4 1,2 -78,69% -84,02% 0,4 0,3 -0,9 -0,9 0,6 0,6 
BHAR 48 -61,32% -98,60% 2,2** 1,9** -58,11% -43,77% -0,9 -1 0,3 0,1 2,6*** 2,2** 
BHAR 36 -47,11% -47,41% 0,1 0,4 -36,27% -30,31% -0,3 -0,1 1,2 1,1 0,7 0,8 
BHAR 24 -27,82% -40,93% 0,8 0,8 -16,82% -14,55% -0,1 -0,2 1,3 0,8 1,1 1,3 
BHAR 12 -9,18% -22,41% 1,1 1,3 7,31% -13,81% 1,6 1,5 2,2** 2,1** 0,5 0,4 
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Table 4 (suite): Long run performance of orphans vs non orphans over the 1991-2005 period. 
 
Table 4 (suite) presents long run performance of French IPOs classified as Orphan’s IPOs (without analyst coverage) and Non orphan’s IPOs (with analyst coverage). Panel C distinguishes 
orphan and non orphan by underwriting syndicate. Number of managers above the median level is classified as Big, otherwise Small. Panel D partitions Orphan’s IPOs and Non orphan’s 
IPOs by underpricing where IPOs that have underpricing above the median level is classified as High otherwise Low. Long run performance is computed as Buy and Hold Abnormal 
Returns over 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60-month performances.  Bootstrapped Skewness-Adjusted (t) test and Wilcoxon (w) non parametric test are presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the 
difference between sample distribution are statistically significant. *; ** and *** indicates significant difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively. Returns are winsorized at the 5% 
and 95% level. 
 Orphan’s IPOs Non orphan’s IPOs   
Panel C Underwriting syndicate Big Small 
 Big Small t w Big Small t w t w t w 
BHAR 60 -76,59% -84,74% 0,4 0,4 -80,69% -83,73% 0,3 0,3 -0,2 -0,1 0,1 0,1 
BHAR 48 -80,36% -76,40% -0,2 0,2 -60,23% -57,46% -0,2 0,1 1,5 1 1,6 1,5 
BHAR 36 -46,86% -51,35% 0,3 0,2 -27,57% -42,63% 1,3 1,1 1,1 1 0,8 0,9 
BHAR 24 -42,58% -25,29% -1,2 -1,1 -19,84% -13,38% -0,6 -0,4 1,5 1,3 1,1 0,7 
BHAR 12 -19,67% -5,44% -1,2 -1,2 6,53% 1,79% 0,4 0,4 2** 1,7* 0,8 0,7 
             
Panel D Underpricing High Low 
 High Low t w High Low t w t w t w 
BHAR 60 -63,14% -94,82% 1,7* 1,6* -67,36% -84,03% 1,3 1 -0,3 -0,3 0,8 0,7 
BHAR 48 -53,04% -89,34% 2,5*** 1,7* -45,46% -63,55% 1,4 1,3 0,4 0,5 2,4*** 1,6* 
BHAR 36 -40,37% -56,62% 1,2 1 -32,83% -35,75% 0,2 0,2 0,5 0,6 1,6 1,6* 
BHAR 24 -21,26% -36,64% 1,2 0,6 -16,82% -22,26% 0,4 0,6 0,3 0,5 1,2 0,7 
BHAR 12 -5,97% -19,66% 1,4 1,8* 6,88% -0,91% 0,6 0,6 1,2 0,9 1,7* 1,6* 
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From this point, we investigate the characteristics of analyst coverage by distinguishing the 
number of coverage and the affiliation of financial analyst. Numerous studies document a 
positive relationship between the number of coverage and subsequent performance over long 
run performance or short-period windows (Das and al., 2006, Bradley and al., 2003). Findings 
appear in table 5. Panel A indicates that IPOs with high coverage (where the number of 
coverage above the median level is classified as ‘high’ otherwise ‘low’) perform better than 
IPOs with low coverage from 4 to 5 years after the IPO date (statistically significant). Panel B 
indicates that once we condition for the affiliation, IPOs covered by affiliated analysts do not 
underperform those covered by unaffiliated analysts. This result is inconsistent with the 
conflict of interest hypothesis but supports our hypothesis H3c which posits that there may be 
no difference in announcement effects between affiliated and unaffiliated recommendation 
because the market is naïve about the differential conflicts of interest. 
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Table 5: Long run performance based on analyst coverage and affiliation. 
 
Table 5 presents long run performance of French IPOs covered by financial analysts. Panel A distinguishes IPOs with high coverage (where the number of analysts is above 
the median level) and IPOs with low coverage (where the number of analysts is below the median level).Panel B partitions analysts by affiliation where analysts whose 
employer is a managing underwriter is classified as affiliated, else unaffiliated. Long run performance is computed as Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns over 12, 24, 36, 48 and 
60-month performances. Bootstrapped Skewness-Adjusted (t) test and Wilcoxon (w) non parametric test are presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference 
between sample distribution are statistically significant. *; ** and *** indicates significant difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively. Returns are winsorized at the 5% 
and 95% level. 
Panel A Low coverage High coverage 
t w 
 Mean Median t w Mean Median t w 
BHAR 60 -94,37% -100,06% -9,4*** -7,8*** -69,44% -73,52% -7,1*** -6,5*** 2,5*** 2,1** 
BHAR 48 -70,49% -80,14% -5,5*** -7*** -47,24% -61,76% -4,4*** -4,9*** 2,2** 2,1** 
BHAR 36 -43,29% -58,09% -4*** -5,4*** -30,13% -36,90% -3,6*** -3,8*** 1,2 1,5 
BHAR 24 -18,69% -38,53% -2,4*** -2,8*** -20,18% -29,65% -2,7*** -3,3*** -0,2 0,3 
BHAR 12 4,61% -6,91% 0,7 0,1 0,14% -5,76% 0,1 -0,2 -0,5 -0,2 
     
Panel B Affiliated Unaffiliated 
t w 
 Mean Median t w Mean Median t w 
BHAR 60 -81,61% -91,90% -5,9*** -6,4*** -74,69% -82,38% -8*** -7,2*** 0,3 0,7 
BHAR 48 -60,04% -71,11% -6*** -6,2*** -52,53% -68,97% -4,6*** -5,2*** 0,7 0,2 
BHAR 36 -40,27% -53,99% -4,1*** -4,8*** -30,87% -44,55% -3,2*** -3,8*** 0,8 0,7 
BHAR 24 -22,43% -42,44% -2,5*** -3,3*** -10,29% -26,30% -1,2 -1,7* 1,1 1 
BHAR 12 6,17% 0,5% 0,8 0,5 2,59% -5,7% 0,4 0,1 -0,4 -0,4 
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Since French IPOs have long run abnormal underperformance, we perform multivariate 
regressions to explain this underperformance according to the interrelationships between 
several variables. 
 
3.3 - Determinants of long run performance: 
 
We have established that firms going public over the 1991-2005 period have long run 
abnormal underperformance. 
From now we investigate whether ex-ante and ex-post variables could explain abnormal 
performance. We study the relation between long run performance and a variety of variables 
that were known to investors at the time of the offering (industry, shares offered, 
underwriters, venture-capital backed...) or occurring within the five years after the IPO date 
(specifically the financial analysts’ recommendations). The null hypothesis of market 
efficiency predicts that all these variables are correctly estimated and can not explain long run 
performance. An alternative hypothesis is that some variables are systematically over or 
undervalued and impact long run performance. 
The dependent variable of regression will be long run performance of French IPOs, computed 
as BHARs over 1, 3 and 5 years. We introduce the following independant variables in our 
analysis: 
3.3.1 - Ex-ante variables and long run performance of IPOs. 
 VC affiliation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if venture capitalists are affiliated to IPOs at 
the time of the offering and 0 otherwise. As in Brav and Gompers (1997), we would expect a 
negative coefficient. 
 Tech firm is a dummy variable equal to 1 if IPO firms are technology firms, 0 otherwise. 
Most of technology firms in our sample went public during the internet bubble, period with 
strong uncertainty and aberrant pricing behaviour (see for instance Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 
2003). We would expect a negative coefficient. 
 Syndicate is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of managing underwriters is above 
the median level and 0 otherwise. Corwin and Schultz (2005) find evidence of information 
production by syndicate members. In IPOs underwritten by large syndicates, the offer price is 
more likely to reflect the true value of the firm. IPOs with a large underwriting syndicate 
should outperform the others. We would expect the coefficient to be positive. 
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 Hot market is a dummy variable equal to 1 if IPOs went public during hot market and 0 
otherwise. We identify 2 years of hot market: 1999 and 2000. According to previous studies, 
we would expect a negative coefficient. 
 Underpricing is a dummy variable equal to 1 if IPOs have initial return above the median 
level and 0 otherwise. Rajan and Servaes (1997) and Carter and al. (1998) find evidence that 
IPOs with a high underpricing underperform the others, so we would expect a negative 
coefficient. 
 
3.3.2 – Ex-post variables and long run performance of IPOs: 
 
3.3.2.1-The characteristics of financial analysts: 
 Aff: this variable equals to 1 if the financial analyst is affiliated and 0 otherwise. Michaely 
and Womack (1999) find, using a sample of 391 IPO in the USA over the period 1990 and 
1991, that affiliated analyst recommendations perform more poorly than recommendations by 
unaffiliated analysts (consistent with Iskoz, 2003, Houston and al. 2006). Affiliated analysts 
issue recommendations that are overly optimistic (positively biased) and these analysts may 
be compelled to issue more positive recommendations on firms that have traded poorly in IPO 
aftermarket (consistent with James and Karceski, 2006). So, if the market is rational, then 
investors should discount affiliated recommendations compared to those of unaffiliated. We 
would expect the coefficient to be negative. 
 
3.3.2.2-The nature of recommendations: 
 Code: this is recommendations made by financial analysts within the five years following 
IPO. This variable is 2 for ‘strong buy’ recommendations, 1, 0, -1, and -2 for ‘buy’, ‘hold’, 
‘underperform’, and ‘sell’ respectively. We suppose that better (worse) recommendations 
have a positive (negative) impact on the long run performance. We would expect the 
coefficient to be positive. 
 Favorable: this is favorable recommendations made by financial analysts within the five 
years following IPO. This variable is 2 for ‘strong buy’ recommendations, 1 for ‘buy’, and 0 
for ‘hold’, ‘underperform’ and ‘sell’. We suppose that favorable recommendations have a 
positive impact on long run performance. We would expect the coefficient to be positive. 
 Defavorable: this is unfavorable recommendations made by financial analysts within the 
five years following IPO. This variable is 2 for ‘sell’ recommendations, 1 for ‘underperform’, 
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and 0 for ‘hold’, ‘buy’ and ‘strong buy’. We suppose that unfavorable recommendations have 
a negative impact on long run performance. We would expect the coefficient to be negative. 
 Initiation: this variable is 2 for ‘strong buy’ recommendation, 1, 0, -1, and -2 for ‘buy’, 
‘hold’, ‘underperform’, and ‘sell’ respectively. We would expect a positive coefficient. 
 Upgrade: we classify recommendation changes as Upgrade, which are upgrades from ‘sell’ 
to ‘hold’ or from ‘buy’ to ‘strong buy’ for example. It takes the value of 2 for ‘strong buy’ 
recommendation, 1, 0, and -1, for ‘buy’, ‘hold’, and ‘underperform’, respectively. We would 
expect a positive coefficient. 
 Downgrade: we classify recommendation changes as Downgrade, which are downgrades 
from ‘strong buy’ to ‘buy’ or from ‘hold’ to ‘sell’ for example. It takes the value of 2 for ‘sell’ 
recommendation, 1, 0, and -1 for ‘underperform’, ‘hold’, and ‘buy’ respectively. We would 
expect a negative coefficient. 
 
3.3.2.3-The strength of recommendations: 
We test the interaction between the characteristics of analysts (whether or not analysts are 
affiliated) and the nature of recommendations. Six variables are used: Aff*Code, 
Aff*Favorable, Aff*Defavorable, Aff*Initiation, Aff*Upgrade and Aff*Downgrade. 
 
3.3.2.4-Control variables: 
 Dispersion: we introduce this as control variable of dispersion of recommendations. It 
represents the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of analysts’ recommendations 
within one, three and five-year following IPO. We interpret this variable as a proxy for 
differences in opinion about a stock. The bigger is Dispersion, the larger is context of strong 
uncertainty which can conduct investors to make irrationals’ choices. We suppose that 
dispersion of analysts’ recommendations have a negative impact on long run performance. So, 
we would expect a negative coefficient. 
 Coverage is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of coverage is above the median 
level and 0 otherwise. Das and al. (2006) and Bradley and al. (2003) find a positive 
relationship between the number of coverage and subsequent performance. We would expect 
a positive coefficient. 
 As in Jain and Kini (1994), we measure the change of operating performance such as 
Return on asset, Asset turnover, Sales and Capital expenditure. The growth in these measures 
may be able to provide an explanation for the underperformance experienced by IPOs during 
the five years after going public. The change in operating performance is measured for one, 
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three and five years after the IPO date. Return on asset is operating income before 
depreciation and taxes divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 13 divided by data 
item 6). Asset turnover is sales (COMPUSTAT data item 12) divided by total assets. Sales 
represent gross sales reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, and returned sales and 
allowances. Capital expenditure (COMPUSTAT data item 128) is cash outflow or funds used 
for additions to the company’s property, plant, and equipment, excluding amounts arising 
from acquisitions. 
 
Three multivariate regression models are reported to estimate the weight of 
recommendations made by analysts to explain long run performance. Model 1 considers the 
whole recommendations whereas Model 2 distinguishes favourable and unfavorable 
recommendations. The interest of this separation is that the market can asymmetrically react 
to favorable news and unfavorable news (see for instance Cooper and al., 2001; Bradley and 
al., 2008; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006). In model 3, we suppose as in previous studies that 
initiation, upgrade or downgrade convey more informations than the value of 
recommendation itself (see for instance Irvine, 2003; Jegadeesh and al., 2004). 
 
Model 1: 
BHAR = α + β1Aff + β2Code + β3Aff*Code + β4Dispersion + β5Coverage + β6Hot market + 
β7Tech firm + β8Syndicate + β9Underpricing + β10Non VC backed + β11Return on asset + 
β12Asset turnover + β13Sales + β14Capital expenditure + ε 
 
Model 2: 
BHAR = α + β1Aff + β2Favorable + β3Defavorable + β4Aff*Favorable + β5Aff*Defavorable 
+β6Dispersion + β7Coverage + β8Hot market + β9Tech firm + β10Syndicate + β11Underpricing 
+ β12Non VC backed + β13Return on asset + β14Asset turnover + β15Sales + β16Capital 
expenditure + ε 
 
Model 3: 
BHAR = α + β1Aff + β2Initiation + β3Upgrade + β4Downgrade + β5Aff*Initiation + 
β6Aff*Upgrade + β7Aff*Downgrade + β8Dispersion + β9Coverage + β10Hot market + β11Tech 
firm + β12Syndicate + β13Underpricing + β14Non VC backed + β15Return on asset + β16Asset 
turnover + β17Sales + β18Capital expenditure + ε 
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Table 6 reports our regression results (corrected for heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity). 
Our three models are statistically significant and explain long run performance of French 
IPOs. The explanatory power of the model is relatively strong (from 20% to nearly 40%) and 
superior compared to previous studies (for instance, model in Degeorge and Derrien (2001) 
explain long run performance from 30% over the one-year horizon to 19% over the three-year 
horizon, Bhabra and Pettway (2003) find R² from 1% to approximately 10% according to 
models). Table 6 shows, over the five-year horizon, that the coefficient on Aff is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. However, the affiliation effect totally disappears when we evaluate 
the strength of recommendation. Variables as Aff*code, Aff*initiation, Aff*favorable are all 
non significant. Thus, the recommendations made by affiliated analysts have no influence on 
long run performance, so as we hypothesize, we could suppose that market seems naïve about 
the differential conflicts of interest and confirm the hypothesis H3c (consistent with table 5 
Panel B). The nature of recommendations is statistically significant for three and five-year 
horizon. Code, Favorable and Initiation variables are significantly related to long run 
performance as we hypothesize. As recommendations could be viewed as endogenous we 
control for operating performance variables and we are able to provide an explanation for the 
underperformance experienced by IPOs. Once we control for operating performance 
variables, it appears that recommendations made by financial analysts explain in a very 
significant way (at 5% level) long run performance over the three and five-year horizon. 
‘Strong buy’ and ‘buy’ (‘underperform’ and ‘sell’) recommendations are positively 
(negatively) related to long run performance. Hence, recommendations have investment value 
and the hypothesis H2 that the nature of recommendations has an impact on long run 
performance could be confirmed. The coefficient on Favorable is positive as we expected, 
favorable recommendations are positively related to long run performance (significant at 10% 
level) whereas the defavorable ones have no impact. We note that market reacts 
asymmetrically for favorable news than unfavorable ones. Upgrade and Downgrade variables 
have no impact on long run performance unlike Initiation that is significantly related to long 
run performance over the three-year horizon. This finding suggests that the market pays more 
attention to the value of recommendations itself than through changes in the 
recommendations. This result is inconsistent with the evidence in Irvine (2003) and Jegadeesh 
and al. (2004). It is worth noting that the first year following the issuance the nature of 
recommendations has no impact on long run performance. This could imply that investors 
fully incorporate the information contained in the recommendations at the time of the 
offering. VC affiliation is negatively and significantly related to long run performance of IPOs 
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over one, three and five-year horizon. Market reacts unfavorably to the presence of venture 
capital financing at the time of an IPO (inconsistent with Brav and Gompers, 1997, 
Megginson and Weiss, 1991 and Barry and al., 1990). This result is broadly consistent with 
the univariate result in table 4 panel B. Finally, the dispersion of analysts is not correlated to 
long run performance whereas the coefficient is the highest over the five-year horizon. Hot 
market variable is positively related to 12-month performance of IPOs (statistically significant 
at 5% level) but the coefficient is not significant to explain long run performance over the 
three and five-year horizon. 
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Table 6: Determinants of long run performance of IPOs over the 1991-2005 period. 
The dependant variable is Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return over a 60, 36 and 12 -month horizon. Returns are winsorized at the 5% and 95% level. Observations correspond to 
analysts recommendations.* (and respectively, **, ***) indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at a 10% (and respectively, 5%, 1%) level using Student 
t-statistics. We use cluster regression model. This specifies that the observations are independent across groups but not necessarily independent within groups. 
 
BHAR 60 months BHAR 36 months BHAR 12 months 
2027 observations (46 IPOs) 1316 observations (48 IPOs) 438 observations (35 IPOs) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -0,673*** -0,679*** -0,662*** -0,559** -0,565** -0,560** -0,220 -0,225 -0,228 
Aff 0,154*** 0,159*** 0,132** -0,034 0,021 -0,035 -0,004 -0,021 -0,028 
Code 0,023**   0,034**   -0,007   
Favorable  0,028*   0,039*   -0,003  
Defavorable  -0,015   -0,025   0,018  
Initiation   0,014   0,048***   0,005 
Upgrade   -0,002   0,026   -0,005 
Downgrade   -0,020   -0,031   0,059 
Aff*Code -0,044   0,012   -0,016   
Aff*Favorable  -0,049   -0,031   -0,004  
Aff*Defavorable  0,035   -0,126   0,279  
Aff*Initiation   -0,046   0,011   0,002 
Aff*Upgrade   0,026   0,029   -0,019 
Aff*Downgrade   0,038   -0,045   -0,390 
Dispersion 1,126 1,123 1,113 -0,331 -0,332 -0,324 -0,011 -0,013 -0,011 
Coverage -0,017 -0,016 -0,015 -0,194 -0,195 -0,190 0,019 0,018 0,029 
Hot market 0,032 0,032 0,031 0,179 0,179 0,175 0,306** 0,304** 0,304** 
Tech firm 0,027 0,027 0,028 0,024 0,024 0,024 -0,062 -0,060 -0,064 
Syndicate -0,030 -0,030 -0,031 0,160 0,160 0,163 0,177 0,179 0,174 
Underpricing 0,026 0,026 0,026 0,199 0,198 0,194 0,026 0,028 0,019 
Non VC backed -0,309* -0,309* -0,310* -0,335* -0,335* -0,335* -0,576*** -0,575*** -0,573*** 
Return on asset -0,163 -0,163 -0,164 0,211 0,215 0,210 0,233 0,233 0,231 
Asset turnover -0,511* -0,511* -0,513* -0,210 -0,215 -0,208 -0,361 -0,359 -0,366 
Sales -0,060 -0,060 -0,059 -0,096 -0,095 -0,096 0,244 0,239 0,234 
Capital  expenditure 0,118 0,118 0,11 0,097** 0,097** 0,097** 0,152 0,152 0,151 
R² 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,21 0,21 0,22 0,38 0,38 0,38 
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4 - Conclusion: 
 
We examine the long run performance of French IPOs carried out between 1991 and 2005. 
Unlike prior studies applied to French market we find that IPOs in our sample performed 
negatively relative to comparison portfolio over the 1991-2005 horizon. We compare the long 
run performance of firms that do not receive analyst coverage (orphan) to those that do (non 
orphan). This abnormal long run performance is much severe for orphans’ IPOs than non 
orphans’ IPOs from the one to three-year horizon. The evidence suggests that analyst 
coverage is indeed important to issuing firm but the market do not fully incorporate the 
perceived value of this coverage. Once we control for other characteristics that have been 
shown to influence long run performance of IPOs we find that investors and market 
participants pay attention to analyst coverage when IPOs are venture capital backed, with a 
big underwriting syndicate and low underpriced. 
We find that firms with high coverage outperform those with low coverage from three to five-
year horizon. Once we condition for the affiliation of the analyst making a recommendation, 
IPOs covered by affiliated analysts do not underperform those covered by unaffiliated 
analysts. This result is inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis (Michaely and 
Womack, 1999) but supports the naïve market hypothesis which posits that there may be no 
difference in announcement effects between affiliated and unaffiliated recommendation 
because the market is naïve about the differential conflicts of interest.  
Multivariate regression analysis establishes that analyst recommendations are significantly 
related to long run performance of IPOs. Then we corroborate the crucial role of financial 
analysts in the production and interpretation of IPOs’ information releases. 
 
Notes 
 
1. It is worth noting that affiliated analyst recommendations are viewed as more credible 
following recent regulatory reforms (Cliff and Tech, 2006, Kadan and al., 2009). 
2. Derrien (2006) finds that security analysts increase their bank’s chance of managing future 
IPOs when they have issued generous recommendations to recent IPOs managed by their own 
bank. 
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